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Abstract.
We present two arguments suggesting that the principle of revealed preference fa-
cilitates the introduction of procedural and psychological aspects of choice to economic
models.
First, some choice procedures cannot be described as the outcome of maximizing a
preference relation. However, they can be characterized and di®erentiated based on a
simple revealed preference argument, i.e. based on simple properties of choice.
Second, even if a choice procedure corresponds to maximizing a preference relation,
there may still be a revealed preference justi¯cation to study the psychology of the pro-
cedure. The information concerning the available set of alternatives is often coupled with
other information pertinent to the psychology of choice. This latter information can shed
light on aspects of choice not fully captured by a preference relation, and hence should
be part of the revealed preference analysis.
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11. Introduction
The revealed preference approach states that economic analysis should be based only
on entities observed by the economist. Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) have recently reopened
the discussion on the role of revealed preference in economic analysis. Without entering
the essence of the discussion (see Rubinstein (2006)1), we argue in this short note that the
revealed preference approach facilitates the introduction of procedural and psychological
aspects of choice to economic models.2
We make two comments to support our argument.
Comment 1. Some choice procedures cannot be described as the outcome of maxi-
mizing a preference relation. However, they can be characterized and di®erentiated based
on a simple revealed preference argument, i.e. based on simple properties of choice.
For example, Manzini and Mariotti (2004) introduce a two stage procedure in which
the decision maker ¯rst selects the set of elements he will seriously consider and then
applies a standard preference relation in order to make a choice. This procedure has
simple properties of revealed preference which di®er from the standard axioms of choice.
Comment 2. Some choice procedures are indistinguishable from standard choice
correspondences that can be described as the outcome of maximizing a preference relation.
One can therefore claim that the psychological considerations involved in these procedures
are not anchored in behavior. However, in many cases, additional information relevant to
the psychology of choice is available (in the same sense that the set of alternatives and the
chosen alternative are available). The revealed preference approach does not imply that
one should ignore this information, but rather that one should use a model of choice that
takes this information into account instead of using a standard choice correspondence.
For example, a choice problem is often presented in the form of a list. A decision maker
who uses a systematic method to choose from lists may choose di®erently from two lists
that induce the same set of alternatives. A standard choice correspondence would attach
to every choice problem the set of all elements chosen for some listing of the alternatives.
Under certain conditions on the method of choice from lists, this choice correspondence
can be explained as the result of maximizing a preference relation (see Rubinstein and
1Rubinstein (2006) argues that there is no escape from including unobserved components of choice in
welfare analysis. For example, if a decision maker maximizes the function ¡v, where v represents his own
perceived interests, it would be wrong to use the function ¡v as a component in welfare analysis.
2Our argument does not con°ict with Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) but is a critique of some of its
possible interpretations.
2Salant (2006)). The possible conclusion that the analysis of choice from lists is not part
of the economist's toolkit is false. The listing of the alternatives is often available and
can be used to describe how actual choices are made | something which a standard
correspondence may not accomplish.
2. Model
Let X be a ¯nite set of alternatives. The standard model of choice assumes that a
choice problem is a non-empty subset of X. Let D be the collection of standard choice
problems. A choice function c attaches to every choice problem A 2 D a single element
c(A) 2 A. A choice correspondence C attaches to every A 2 D a non-empty subset of A.
In real life situations, a choice problem often appears with a frame. A frame is ad-
ditional information associated with the choice problem that may serve as a component
of the choice procedure though it may not convey information relevant to the assessment
of the alternatives. A frame may be the outcome of exogenous manipulation such as the
order in which vacation packages are listed in a brochure. A frame can also be purely
internal, as in the case of a decision maker who mentally enumerates the elements of the
set.
Formally, an extended choice problem is a pair (A;f) where A 2 D and f is an abstract
object called a frame. Let D¤ be the collection of extended choice problems. An extended
choice function c¤ assigns an element of A to every (A;f) 2 D¤. An extended choice
function c¤ with domain D¤ induces a standard choice correspondence Cc¤ with domain
D, where Cc¤(A) is the set of elements chosen from the set A for some frame f. In other
words,
Cc¤(A) = fx j c
¤(A;f) = x for some (A;f) 2 D
¤g:
When several frames are associated with a given choice problem A, the cardinality of
Cc¤(A) may re°ect the tendency of the decision maker to be in°uenced by the frame. The
smaller Cc¤(A) the less the decision maker is in°uenced by manipulating the frame.
Following are several examples of extended choice problems that we discuss throughout
the paper.
1. Leading Considerations. The description or the content of the choice prob-
lem triggers the decision maker to think primarily about a particular consideration. An
extended choice problem is a pair (A;Â) where Â is an ordering that re°ects the consid-
eration used by the decision maker to evaluate the elements of the set A.
2. Focus on Relevant Elements. The decision maker identi¯es a subset of elements
3in the choice problem as the relevant alternatives and chooses from among them. An
extended choice problem is a pair (A;B) where B µ A is the set of relevant elements in
A.
3. List. The decision maker evaluates the elements of the set as a list. An extended
choice problem is a pair (A;>) where > is an ordering of the elements of A from ¯rst to
last.
4. Number of Appearances. An alternative may appear more than once in the
choice menu. An extended choice problem is a pair (A;i) where i is a function that assigns
to every a 2 A the number i(a) of times a appears in the menu.
5. Default Alternative. One of the alternatives is designated as the default alter-
native. An extended choice problem is a pair (A;x) where x 2 A is a default alternative.
The ¯rst two examples appear most often in contexts in which we do not observe
the frame associated with the choice problem. We usually do not observe the leading
consideration triggered by the content of the choice problem (example 1) or the set of
alternatives which are seriously considered (example 2). The rest of the examples are
often (though, of course, not always) observed with the frame. We often observe the
order of the elements in a set (example 3), the number of appearances of an alternative
within a menu (example 4) or the default alternative (example 5).
3. First Comment: Non-Standard Choice
In this section we examine two contexts in which certain assumptions on a frame-
sensitive choice procedure are equivalent to non-standard restrictions on choice corre-
spondences. These examples demonstrate how procedural aspects of choice can be di®er-
entiated based on a standard revealed preference argument, i.e. based on actual choices
from standard choice problems.
3.1. Triggered Rationality
The choice procedure we have in mind in this subsection is one in which the most
salient element in the choice problem induces the decision maker to use a particular
rationale when making a choice. For example, when choosing among vacation packages,
one may either maximize the entertainment value or the historic signi¯cance of the trip
depending on whether Las Vegas appears among the available options.
Formally, an extended choice problem is a pair (A;Â) where Â is an ordering that
re°ects the consideration the decision maker uses when choosing from A. We say that an
4extended choice function c¤ satis¯es Triggered Rationality if there is an array of orderings
fÂaga2X (not necessarily distinct) and a saliency ordering R over X such that:
(i) the set D¤ contains all the pairs (A;Â) where Â=Âa¤ for a¤ which is the R-maximal
element in A.
(ii) c¤(A;Â) is the Â-maximal element in A.
Of course, there are natural choice procedures that use more general attributes of the
choice problem in order to determine which consideration to use. For example, a choice
procedure which uses a particular rationale when the set is symmetric3 and a di®erent
one when the set is asymmetric does not fall within the category of Triggered Rationality.
From the point of view of standard choice, the above procedure is characterized by
the property that for every choice problem A, there exists a 2 A such that the standard
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives4 (IIA) property holds for subsets of A that contain
a.
Formally, a standard choice function c satis¯es the Reference Point property if for
every set A, there exists a 2 A such that if a 2 A00 ½ A0 ½ A and c(A0) 2 A00, then
c(A00) = c(A0).
Proposition. A standard choice function c satis¯es the Reference Point property if
and only if there is an extended choice function c¤ satisfying Triggered Rationality such
that c = Cc¤.
Proof. Assume that c satis¯es the Reference Point property. We construct the func-
tion c¤ which satis¯es Triggered Rationality recursively. Consider the set X. By the
Reference Point property there exists an element a such that for all subsets of X that
contain a the standard IIA property holds. Thus, there exists a preference relation Âa
such that its maximization describes the choices of c whenever a is available. Let a be
the R-maximal element in X. Continue recursively with the set X n fag.
In the other direction, assume c¤ satis¯es Triggered Rationality with respect to a
preference array fÂaga2X and a saliency ordering R. Let a be the R-maximal element in
A. Assume that a 2 A00 ½ A0 ½ A and c(A0) 2 A00. The element a is also R-maximal in
both A0 and A00 and thus c(A0), the Âa-maximal element of A0, is also the Âa-maximal
element of A00. Consequently, c(A00) = c(A0). ¥
3A set A is symmetric if x 2 A implies y 2 A for any y » x where » is a symmetric binary relation
over X.
4A choice function c satis¯es the standard Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property if c(A) 2
B ½ A implies that c(B) = c(A).
53.2 Post-Dominance Rationality
The choice procedure we have in mind in this subsection is one in which the decision
maker ¯rst eliminates any alternative which he deems dominated in some sense by an-
other alternative. He then chooses the best alternative from among the non-dominated
alternatives.
Formally, an extended choice problem is a pair (A;B) where A is a choice problem
and B µ A is a non-empty subset of relevant elements. We say that an extended choice
function c¤ satis¯es Post-Dominance Rationality if:
(i) There exists an acyclic binary relation R such that D¤ consists of all the pairs
(A;B) where B = fb j there is no a 2 A such that aRbg. That is, aRb means that the
presence of a in the choice problem excludes b from the set of relevant elements.
(ii) There exists a binary relation Â, which is transitive whenever restricted to sets of
elements that do not dominate one another, such that c¤(A;B) is the Â-maximal element
in B.
Comment. The relation Â need not be transitive for all triples of alternatives. In-
transitivity is possible for triples in which one of the alternatives is excluded by R. For
example, let X = fa;b;c;dg and let R be the relation for which x/ Ry except for aRc and
bRd. Let Â be the order relation a Â b Â c Â d except that d Â a and not a Â d. De¯ne
c¤ accordingly. Then c¤ is a non-empty function that satis¯es Post-Dominance Rationality
though Â is not transitive.
The notion of Post-Dominance Rationality was suggested by Manzini and Mariotti
(2004) who characterize this procedure in terms of properties of choice from sets. We
establish a di®erent connection between Post-Dominance Rationality and standard choice.
Exclusion Consistency. A standard choice function c satis¯es Exclusion Consis-
tency if for every set A and for every a 2 X, if c(A [ fag) = 2 fc(A);ag then there is no
set A0 which contains a such that c(A0) = c(A).
Proposition. A standard choice function c satis¯es Exclusion Consistency if and only
if there exists an extended choice function c¤ which satis¯es Post-Dominance Rationality
such that c = Cc¤.
Proof. Assume c satis¯es Exclusion Consistency. We de¯ne two binary relations R
and Â as follows:
(i) aRb if there is a set A such that c(A) = b and c(A [ fag) = 2 fa;bg.
(ii) a Â b if c(fa;bg) = a.
6The relation R is acyclic. If there were a cycle, then by Exclusion Consistency, no
element could be chosen from the set of all elements in the cycle.
The relation Â is asymmetric and complete. The relation Â is transitive whenever
restricted to sets of elements that do not relate to one another by R. Otherwise, assume
that a Â b, b Â c and c Â a and that a;b;c are not related by R. Without loss of
generality assume that c(fa;b;cg) = b. Then, since c(fa;bg) = a we should have cRa, a
contradiction.
For every set A, de¯ne B to be the set of R-maximal elements in A, and c¤(A;B)
to be the Â-maximal element in B. Then, c¤(A;B) satis¯es Post-Dominance Rationality
and is non-empty for every set A. We need to show that c(A) = Cc¤(A).
Let A0 = B be the set of R-maximal elements in A, and denote its cardinality by
K. We ¯rst show that c(A0) = Cc¤(A0). Since the elements of A0 are not related by R,
Cc¤(A0) is the Â-maximal element in A0. If c(A0) = a is not the Â-maximal element in
A0 then there exists b 2 A0 such that b Â a. By de¯nition c(fa;bg) = b. Enumerate
the set A0: a1 = a;a2 = b; :::;aK. Let k¤ = maxfk j c(fa1;a2;:::;akg) 6= ag. Then
2 · k¤ < K and ak¤+1Rc(fa1;::;ak¤g) which contradicts the de¯nition of A0.
Inductively, construct a sequence of sets Ak starting with A0. Let Ak+1 = Ak [ fbg
where b is an R-maximal element in A ¡ Ak. Then b is R-dominated by an element
in Ak and hence by Exclusion Consistency c(Ak [ fbg) 6= b. By construction, b does not
dominate any element in Ak including c(Ak) and hence c(Ak[fbg) = c(Ak). Consequently,
c(A) = c(A0). Thus, c(A) is the Â-maximal element among the R-maximal elements in
A, which implies that c(A) = Cc¤(A).
In the other direction, suppose that c¤ satis¯es Post-Dominance Rationality with the
relations R and Â. Then Cc¤(A) is the Â-maximal element among the R-maximal elements
in A. We now need to show that c = Cc¤ satis¯es Exclusion Consistency. Assume that
c(A) = Cc¤(A) = a and c(A [ b) = Cc¤(A [ b) = 2 fa;bg. It must be that bRa and, by the
de¯nition of c¤, the element a is never chosen from a set in which b appears. Consequently,
c(A0) 6= a whenever b 2 A0. ¥
4. Second Comment: Standard Choice and Framing
In this section we examine three contexts in which properties of a frame-sensitive
choice procedure imply that the induced choice correspondence satis¯es standard axioms
of choice. Thus, one might argue that there is no revealed preference basis for integrating
these procedures into economic models. We would argue otherwise. It is often natural
7to assume that an observer sees not just the choice problem and the chosen element
but the frame as well. This is especially true when the frame is manipulated by an
exogenous device, such as when a marketer arranges the elements according to some order
or highlights one element as the default. In such cases, the revealed preference approach
does not exclude the interest in frame-sensitive choice procedures even if they imply only
standard assumptions on choice. The information conveyed by the frame may provide
important insights into choice, particularly in cases in which the induced correspondence
speci¯es more than one element as a possible choice.
4.1 Choice from Lists
In this subsection, an extended choice problem is a pair (A;>) where A is a choice
problem and > is an ordering of A. In other words, the decision maker chooses from lists.
We assume that any ordering of the elements of A is possible.
In Rubinstein and Salant (2006) we studied the following property of an extended
choice function c¤:
List Independence of Irrelevant alternatives (LIIA). If c¤(A;>) = a, then
c(A ¡ fbg;>jA¡fbg) = a for every b 6= a.
We showed that any extended choice function which satis¯es LIIA induces a choice
correspondence which satis¯es the standard Weak Axiom5 (WA). We provide a simpler
proof here.
Proposition (Rubinstein and Salant (2006)).
(i) If an extended choice function c¤ satis¯es LIIA, then Cc¤ satis¯es WA.
(ii) If C is a choice correspondence that satis¯es WA, then there exists an extended
choice function c¤ satisfying LIIA such that C = Cc¤.
Proof. (i) Assume a;b 2 A \ B, a 2 Cc¤(A) and b 2 Cc¤(B). Then there exist
>1 and >2 such that c¤(A;>1) = a and c¤(B;>2) = b. Let >3 be an ordering which is
identical to >2 except for a appearing ¯rst if a >1 b and last if b >1 a. We now show that
c¤(B;>3) = a.
It is impossible that c¤(B;>3) = x = 2 fa;bg. Otherwise, by LIIA c¤(B ¡ fag;>3jB¡fag
) = x. Since c¤(B;>2) = b LIIA implies that c¤(B ¡ fag;>2jB¡fag) = b. This contradicts
the fact that >2 and >3 are identical on B ¡fag and thus should induce the same choice.
5A choice correspondence C satis¯es the Weak Axiom if a;b 2 A \ B, a 2 C(A) and b 2 C(B) imply
that a 2 C(B).
8It is also impossible that c¤(B;>3) = b. Otherwise, by LIIA c¤(fa;bg;>3jfa;bg) = b. In
addition, LIIA implies that c¤(fa;bg;>1jfa;bg) = a but >1 and >3 are identical on fa;bg.
Thus, c¤(B;>3) = a as required.
(ii) If C satis¯es WA then there exists a weak preference relation % over X which C
maximizes. De¯ne c¤(A;>) to be the ¯rst %-maximal element in A according to >. Then
c¤ satis¯es LIIA and C = Cc¤. ¥
The model of choice from lists most clearly illustrates our assertion regarding revealed
preference and the observability of the frame. The information on the set of available
alternatives is often supplemented by the order of the alternatives. This is true especially
when the list is generated by an exogenous mechanism, e.g., entrees are listed on a menu
and products in a brochure. In such cases, the study of choice from lists is valuable,
as it analyzes an important observable factor that a®ects choice and suggests a novel
interpretation of choice correspondences.
4.2 Number of Appearances
In this subsection an extended choice problem is a pair (A;i) where i(a) is the number
of times the element a appears in the set A.
We discuss two properties of extended choice functions:
Subtraction. If c¤(A;i) = a and i0 is such that i0(b) = i(b) ¡ 1 ¸ 1 for b 6= a, then
c¤(A;i0) = a. If b 6= a and i(b) = 1, then c¤(A ¡ fbg;ijA¡fbg) = a.
Note that when i(a) = 1 for every element a 2 A, Subtraction reduces to the standard
IIA property.
Additivity. If c¤(A;i) = a and i0 is such that for every b 2 B µ A i0(b) = i(b) + 1,
then c¤(A;i0) = a if a 2 B.
In other words, adding one instance of several elements including the chosen element
does not alter the choice.
Proposition. (i) If an extended choice function c¤ satis¯es Subtraction and Additivity
then Cc¤ satis¯es WA.
(ii) If a choice correspondence C satis¯es WA then there exists c¤ satisfying Subtraction
and Additivity such that C = Cc¤.
Proof. (i) Assume that a;b 2 A \ B, a 2 Cc¤(A) and b 2 Cc¤(B). Then there exists
i such that c¤(A;i) = a and i0 such that c¤(B;i0) = b. By Additivity, we can assume
9without loss of generality that i(b) = i0(b). By Subtraction, c¤(fa;bg;ijfa;bg) = a and
c¤(fa;bg;i0
jfa;bg) = b, which implies that i(a) > i0(a). De¯ne i00 = i0 except for i00(a) =
i(a). Then, c¤(B;i00) 2 fa;bg by Subtraction. Finally, c¤(B;i00) = c¤(fa;bg;i00
jfa;bg) =
c¤(fa;bg;ijfa;bg) = a which implies that a 2 C(B).
(ii) If C satis¯es WA then there exists a weak preference relation % which C maximizes.
De¯ne c¤(A;i) to be a %-maximal element with the highest number of appearances and
resolve ties according to some order relation. Then c¤ satis¯es Subtraction and Additivity
and C = Cc¤. ¥
This model is another case in which the information conveyed by the frame is often
observed and the presentation of the choice problem as a standard set excludes available
relevant information. Once again, the above proposition implies that one cannot distin-
guish between a choice correspondence induced by a procedure which takes into account
the number of appearances of the alternatives and a choice correspondence which is the
outcome of maximizing a preference relation. Nonetheless, even from the point of view of
revealed preference, it is a mistake to conclude that there is no place for models of choice
in which this frame appears.
4.3 Default Alternative
In this subsection an extended choice problem is a pair (A;x) where x 2 A is inter-
preted as a default alternative. We assume that any element x 2 A can serve as a default
alternative. A similar framework is discussed in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) and Zhou
(1997).
We study the following two properties of extended choice functions:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA¤). If x 2 A ½ B and c¤(B;x) 2 A,
then c¤(A;x) = c¤(B;x).
In other words, if an element is chosen from a set, it is also chosen from all subsets of
the set as long as the default does not change. This property is equivalent to the existence
of an array of preference relations fÂaga2X such that c¤(A;x) is the Âx-maximal element
in A.
Default Tendency. If c¤(A;x) = a then c¤(A;a) = a.
That is, if an element a is chosen from a set A with some default element, then a is
also chosen from A when it becomes the default element.
Given IIA¤, the property of Default Tendency is equivalent to the condition whereby
10a Âx b implies that a Âa b. Thus, the two properties characterize choice procedures that
apply di®erent rationales as a function of the default option and show preference for the
default alternative.
The following proposition complements the result of Gul and Pesendorfer (2005).6
Proposition.
(i) If c¤ satis¯es IIA¤ and Default Tendency then there exists a transitive asymmetric
binary relation Â over X such that for every set A, the set Cc¤(A) contains all the Â-
maximal elements in A.
(ii) Let C be a choice correspondence that maximizes a transitive asymmetric binary
relation Â. Then there exists a choice function c¤ that satis¯es IIA¤ and Default Tendency
such that C = Cc¤.
Proof. (i) Assume c¤ satis¯es IIA¤ and Default Tendency. For any two elements a
and b, de¯ne a Â b if c¤(fa;bg;b) = a. By Default Tendency Â is asymmetric.
Note that if a Â b, then for every set A such that a;b 2 A, c¤(A;x) 6= b. Otherwise,
by Default Tendency, c¤(A;b) = b and by IIA¤, c¤(fa;bg;b) = b.
To see that the relation Â is transitive, assume that a Â b and b Â c. By the above,
c¤(fa;b;cg;c) is neither b nor c and therefore it must be a. Then, by IIA¤, c¤(fa;cg;c) = a
which implies that a Â c.
It remains to show that Cc¤(A) is the set of Â-maximal elements in A. By Default
Tendency, x 2 Cc¤(A) if and only if c¤(A;x) = x. By IIA¤, c¤(A;x) = x if and only if
c¤(fx;yg;x) = x for every y 2 A. By the de¯nition of Â, c¤(fx;yg;x) = x if and only if
y  x. Thus, x 2 Cc¤(A) if and only if there is no y 2 A such that y Â x.
(ii) Expand the relation Â to form a complete order relation Â¤. For every A µ X
and x 2 A, de¯ne
c¤(A;x) =
(
x if x 2 C(A)
the Â¤-maximal element in fy 2 A j y Â xg if x = 2 C(A):
The function c¤ is single-valued because x = 2 C(A) implies that fy 2 A j y Â xg 6= ;
and because Â¤ is a complete order relation.
The function c¤ satis¯es IIA¤. Assume that c¤(A;x) = a. Let B µ A with a;x 2 B.
We need to show that c¤(B;x) = a. If x 2 C(A) then x = a is Â-maximal in A and
therefore in B, which implies that x 2 C(B) and c¤(B;x) = x. If x = 2 C(A) then a is
6Gul and Pesendorfer's characterization involves a complete but not necessarily transitive binary
relation, while ours involves a transitive but not necessarily complete relation.
11the Â¤-maximal element in fy 2 A j y Â xg. Since a 2 B µ A, x is not Â-maximal
in B and thus x = 2 C(B). The element a continues to be the Â¤-maximal element in
fy 2 B j y Â xg µ fy 2 A j y Â xg and thus c¤(B;x) = a.
The function c¤ satis¯es Default Tendency. If c¤(A;x) = a and a 6= x then a is Â¤-
maximal in fy 2 A j y Â xg. Therefore, a is Â-maximal in A, which means that a 2 C(A).
By de¯nition, c¤(A;a) = a.
Finally, Cc¤ = C. If x 2 C(A) then c¤(A;x) = x and thus x 2 Cc¤(A). If x = 2 C(A),
then by de¯nition c¤(A;x) 6= x. Since c¤ satis¯es Default Tendency, c¤(A;y) 6= x for all
y 2 A and thus x = 2 Cc¤(A). ¥
As in the previous two examples, one may interpret the above result as a claim that
there is no revealed preference basis for maximization that depends on the default alterna-
tive. However, there are contexts (though probably less common than in the previous two
examples) in which we observe not only the set of alternatives and the chosen element but
also the default alternative. This occurs, for example, when the default is an alternative
previously chosen by the decision maker or one chosen by another person. In such cases,
we believe that the right model of choice is an extended choice function rather than a
standard choice correspondence.
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